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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The landlord's arguments before the Court of Appeals followed two courses.
The Court rejected the landlord's first contention that the regulation was invalid
because it was in conflict with the authorizing statute of the Commission. It
was held that while Section 2 gave the Supreme Court the power to determine
the amount of the increased rent, Section 13 merely gave the Commission the
power to rule on the validity of the change from residential to business use.
The Court concluded that "lawfully occupied" as used in Section 2 included
the later regulation known as Section 13 and that decontrol orders were
necessary before Section 2 emergency rent could be allowed by the Supreme
Court. The holding refuted any authority in the Supreme Court to rule for
itself on the validity of the conversion to business use.
Sipal Realty then contended that even if the sections were consistent,
Section 13 had no application to these facts. Noting that one basic purpose
of Section 13 was to prevent the unscrupulous landlord from forcing the
tenant of residential property into signing a business lease so as to take
advantage of emergency rent,3 3 it was argued that, here, no such unethical
practices could take place since there were structural changes that evidenced a
conversion of residential to business property.
Along the same lines, appellant argued that the changes were such that no
longer were the premises "housing accommodations" within the meaning of
Section 13. The landlord cited the Residential Rent Law which defines "housing
accommodations" in terms of sleeping places and boarding houses.3 4 Appellants
then attempted to show that the suites in question were no longer suitable for
these uses.
The Court answered both arguments by stating that structural change was
only one of the factors to be considered by the Administrator in determining
whether there had been a good faith conversion.
As a result of this decision it is now settled that when residential space is
,converted to business space, the Commission and not the Court must be
satisfied that the conversion is legitimate and not merely a device to get
increased rent, before the Supreme Court can increase the rent as authorized by
Section 2. Until decontrol orders are issued the premises are subject to
residential rent control.
P.D.C.
YEAR-DELAY CLAUSE IN LEGISLATION IN REGARD TO FIXATION OF MAXIMUm
RENT CONSTITUTIONAL
In I.L.F.Y. Co. v. Temporary State Housing Rent Commission,3 the
became due was when the premises were converted to business space. In addition the
landlord argued that since rent control was in derogation of his common law rights,
any provision must be construed in the light most favorable to him.
33. See "Note of Commission" following Section 13 of the Rent and Eviction
Regulations.
34. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8582(2) (McKinney 1961).
35. 10 N.Y.2d 263, 219 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1961).
COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
plaintiff challenged the validity of an amendment to the Emergency Housing
Rent Control Law.36 Plaintiff had purchased a rent-controlled apartment house
in Manhattan on February 20, 1961. Pursuant to statute,37 the plaintiff
tendered an application to the Rent Commission for the purpose of fixing higher
rents computed on the new valuation of the apartment house. Prior to the
Rent Commission's action on the application, the State Legislature passed the
amendment in controversy.38 The amendment states that a purchaser of a rent-
controlled apartment house cannot increase the rents based on the new purchase
price for one year from the date of purchase. This amendment was a modifi-
cation of the past law which permitted an owner of newly acquired property
to immediately increase his rents as provided by the former statute. Conse-
quently, plaintiff was deprived of one year's increase in rent which he would
have been able to receive prior to the enactment of the amendment. Plaintiff
argued that due process demands that a law be not unreasonable or arbitrary
and that it be reasonably related and applied to some actual and manifest
evil.89
The Court of Appeals shows by sufficient factual data that the legislature
has made a substantial investigation to warrant its legislation.4 0 The Court
further states that even if there were no record of the investigation, it may be
presumed that the Legislature has made sufficient inquiry into the matter.41
The purpose of rent control is to prevent undue rent increases and is,
therefore, beneficial to the public welfare. 42 Therefore, the constitutionality of
the amendment is upheld by the Court on the basis of the police power of the
State, which can be utilized to deter unwarranted and abnormal increases in
rents so as to protect public health, safety and general welfare. The strong
presumption in favor of the constitutionality of legislation coupled with the
strong police power of the State point to the soundness of the Court's opinion.
L. H. S.
STATUTORY RELIEF FOR TENANTS OF DESTROYED PREMISES RENDERED IN-
APPLICABLE BY PARTIES' CONTRARY AGREEMENT
At common law, absent an agreement to the contrary, destruction of a
building on land held under lease did not entitle the tenant to terminate his
36. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8584(4) (a) (1) (v) (McKinney 1961).
37. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws, Rent and Eviction Regulations of the Temporary State
Housing Rent Commission § 33(5) (McKinney's Appendix 1961).
38. Supra note 36.
39. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Defiance Milk Products Co. v.
DuMond, 309 N.Y. 537, 132 N.E.2d 829 (1956); Matter of Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
40. See Rep. of the Comm. to Study Rents and Rental Conditions, Report on Rent
Control, N.Y. Laws 1961, p. 1971; Report of Spec. Comm. to Study the Sales Price Basis
and Evictions for New Housing under the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law, Report
on Rent Control, N.Y. Laws 1961, p. 1985.
41. Defiance Milk Products Co. v. DuMond, supra note 39; Lincoln Bldg. Associates
v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1956).
42. New York University v. Temporary State Housing Rent Commission, 304 N.Y.
124, 106 N.E.2d 44 (1952).
